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KEY POINTS
	 PSD2 safeguarding rules have room for improvement.
	 A comparison of Dutch and Brazilian safeguarding rules enables an in-depth analysis of 
the level of protection.
	 An objective criterion of assessment of safeguarding rules shows that the current 
safeguarding rules could – and should – be enhanced.
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PSD2 and the safeguarding of clients’ funds: 
a comparative analysis with respect to 
funds of payment service users in the 
Netherlands and Brazil
This article concerns the protection of payment service users’ funds in case of insolvency 
of a payment institution, ie a payment services provider that escapes the label of “credit 
institution”, both in the Netherlands (representing the EU/EEA) and in Brazil. 
INTRODUCTION
nPayment institutions, introduced by Directive 2007/64/EC (PSD1 
– later replaced by Directive 2015/2366/
EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, or PSD2), operate in one of the most 
sensitive and important areas of the financial 
system. A failure in payments can have severe 
consequences, and thus payment institutions 
have to comply with rules to protect clients’ 
funds. The protection of such funds is also 
necessary to enable the provision of payment 
services by payment institutions, and to ensure 
that the monies “deposited” in payment 
accounts are not lost or jeopardized in case of 
insolvency of payment institutions. 
One of these rules is the rule set under Art 
10 of PSD2, called “safeguarding requirements”. 
Pursuant to this provision, EU/EEA member 
states shall require a payment institution to 
safeguard all funds received from payment 
service users or through another payment 
service provider for the execution of payment 
transactions. The provision allows for this 
safeguarding to be achieved in two ways. In 
the first approach, set forth under Art 10 (1) 
(a) PSD2, the funds shall not be commingled 
at any time with the funds of the payment 
institution and, where they are still held by the 
payment institution by the end of the business 
day following the day of receipt, they shall 
be deposited in a separate account in a credit 
institution or invested in secure, liquid low-risk 
assets, and they shall be insulated in accordance 
with national law in the interest of the payment 
service users against the claims of other creditors 
of the payment institution, in particular in the 
event of insolvency. In the second approach, set 
forth under Art 10 (1) (b) PSD2, the funds 
shall be covered by an insurance policy or some 
other comparable guarantee from an insurance 
company or a credit institution for an amount 
equivalent to that which would have been 
segregated in the absence of the insurance policy 
or other comparable guarantee. 
Similar safeguarding requirements apply 
to electronic money institutions, both where 
it concerns funds received from payment 
service users or through other payment service 
providers and funds received in exchange for 
electronic money that has been issued. The latter 
funds shall be safeguarded by no later than five 
business days after the issuance of the electronic 
money (Art 7 Directive 2009/110/EC). 
For the avoidance of doubt, it should be 
observed that the safeguarding requirement set 
forth under Art 10 (1) (a) PSD2 only pertains to 
the funds and not to the financial instruments in 
which the funds may be invested. These financial 
instruments will most likely be held in custody 
with a credit institution or an investment firm 
for the payment institution and will have to be 
safeguarded against such custodian’s insolvency 
in accordance with Art 16 (8) MiFID II, but 
will not be protected against the payment 
institution’s insolvency.
The movement in Europe towards a safer 
and more competitive payment system was 
followed by Brazil, in which jurisdiction Law 
12,865/2013 followed the same approach seen 
in the EU/EEA since 2009. Banco Central do 
Brasil (BACEN), the Brazilian Central Bank, 
constantly issues and updates provisions 
regarding payment institutions and the 
protection of the payment system as a whole. 
In Brazil, the safeguarding requirements apply 
to instituições emissoras de moeda eletrônica. 
Literally translated, this means electronic 
money institutions. This could create the 
impression that the safeguarding requirements 
only relate to electronic money institutions and 
not to payment institutions. However, under 
Brazilian law these instituições emissoras de 
moeda eletrônica correspond to both electronic 
money institutions and payment institutions. 
The problem discussed in this article 
concerns the protection of payment service 
users’ funds in case of insolvency of a payment 
institution, ie a payment services provider that 
escapes the label of  “credit institution”, both in 
the Netherlands (representing the EU/EEA) 
and in Brazil. Our conclusions may be applied 
analogously to the protection of clients’ funds 
at electronic money institutions. 
HOW TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT 
FRAMEWORK?
Four key indicators could help us to get a better 
understanding of the current arrangements as 
well as reveal how the protection of payment 
service users could be improved: 
	 Who holds title to the funds? 
	 Can the funds be subject to security 
interests or set-off rights relating to 
obligations of the payment institution?
	 How long does it take for funds to be 
recovered by the payment service users 





























in case of insolvency of the payment 
institution?
	 What are the operational requirements 
that back the legal segregation of the funds 
from the payment institutions’ assets?
TITLE TO THE FUNDS
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the solution most frequently 
applied in practice (regarding the method of 
safeguarding prescribed under Art 10 (1) (a) 
of PSD2) is the set-up of a separate “retention 
institution”, a bankruptcy remote special purpose 
vehicle (SPV), mostly in the form of a foundation 
(stichting), to which the funds are entrusted. This 
SPV is generally referred to as a third-party 
funds foundation or a stichting derdengelden, the 
sole purpose of which is the receiving, managing 
and distributing of the funds.
In this set-up, legal title to the funds is with 
the SPV and the payment service users have 
a direct right against the SPV. It is the SPV 
and not the payment institution that holds 
the account in which the funds are credited at 
the account servicing credit institution. In this 
way, the funds do not form part of the assets 
of the payment institution and will not fall in 
the payment institution’s insolvency estate. The 
SPV is set up as a bankruptcy remote entity, so 
the risk of it becoming insolvent is virtually zero. 
Article 10 PSD2 is implemented in 
Dutch law in Art 3:29a of the Wet op het 
financieel toezicht (Financial Supervision Act) 
in conjunction with Art 40a of the Besluit 
prudentiële regels Wft (Prudential Rules 
Decree). These provisions merely paraphrase 
Art 10 PSD2 and do not prescribe the 
creation of an SPV nor do they provide 
for any other specific solution. It is up to 
the payment institution to make adequate 
arrangements to safeguard the rights of 
clients. However, from the explanatory 
memorandum to Art 40a of the Besluit 
prudentiële regels Wft and the explanatory 
notes to the licence application issued by  
De Nederlandsche Bank (the Dutch Central 
Bank, DNB) it can be deduced that 
segregation of clients’ funds via the creation of 
an SPV is a valid method of insulating clients’ 
funds against claims of other creditors of the 
payment institution. 
Brazil
In Brazil, we should look at Art 12 of Circular 
3,681/2013 of BACEN. The funds “deposited” 
in the payment institution by the payment service 
users are either kept in a special account at the 
Central Bank or invested in government bonds. 
What is seen in practice is that the funds 
are normally invested in government bonds, 
such bonds qualifying as secure, liquid low-risk 
assets. The payment institution is the holder 
of the bonds’ titularity. These bonds, in their 
turn, are in custody in a Central Securities 
Depository: Sistema Especial de Liquidação e 
Custódia (Selic), the Brazilian Special System 
for Settlement and Custody. Such custody 
is achieved through a credit institution (the 
path starts at the payment service users, which 
“deposit” funds in a payment institution; this 
institution then buys bonds and obtains the 
respective titularity; the payment institution 
needs a credit institution to hold the bonds 
ultimately at Selic). The clients of the payment 
institutions are not less protected in Brazil:  
Art 12 of Law 12,865/2013 affirms that 
the funds of payment accounts constitute a 
segregated estate, which shall not be merged 
with the payment institution’s assets (especially 
in the case of insolvency of the institution).
SECURITY INTEREST
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, title to the funds is with 
the foundation (stichting) set up for the specific 
purpose of safeguarding the funds. The 
foundation may not carry out activities other 
than the retention of clients’ funds.  
It may only dispose of any or all of the funds 
with a view to the execution of a payment 
transaction and only if the payment service 
user has given its consent. Therefore, although 
from a property law point of view the SPV 
would be entitled to vest a right of pledge 
on the funds, either in favour of the account 
servicing credit institution or of a third party, 
for the purpose of securing obligations of its 
own or of the payment institution, such pledge 
would be in contravention of the safeguarding 
requirements, because it could result in the 
SPV becoming unable to comply with its 
obligations towards clients. If the pledge would 
not be invalid for that reason, it would probably 
be voidable on the grounds of the SPV having 
acted ultra vires by having vested it.
The pledging of the claims of the SPV vis-à-
vis the account servicing credit institution by the 
SPV should of course be distinguished from the 
pledging by the clients of their rights vis-à-vis the 
SPV. It is not uncommon for the clients to pledge 
these rights to the payment institution for the 
purpose of securing present or future, actual or 
contingent or prospective obligations of the client 
vis-à-vis the payment institution.
Brazil
In Brazil, according to Law 13,105/2015 
(Brazilian Civil Procedure Code), monies and 
rights can be subject to a security interest (as laid 
down in Arts 831, 834 and 835). Almost all rights 
and goods can be vested in a security interest, with 
some exceptions (listed in Art 833). However, 
none of the exceptions apply to safeguarded funds. 
Ergo, the answer to the question whether 
the funds of payment service users in payment 
accounts can be subject to a security interest is 
yes. However, Art 12 of Law 12,865/2013 states 
that the funds maintained in payment accounts 
cannot be pledged or encumbered by way of a 
security interest regarding debts undertaken by 
the payment institution. The funds and/or the 
bonds (as it is the common practice in Brazil) can 
be pledged if the underlying obligation relates to 
a debt of the payment service users, and not to a 
debt of the payment institution.
SPEED OF RECOVERY
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, no rules corresponding to the 
speed of recovery are found under the Wet op het 
financieel toezicht or the Besluit prudentiële regels Wft.
Brazil
In Brazil, there are no provisions in the 
Circulares issued by BACEN, neither in Law 
12,865/2013 nor in Law 6,024/1974 regarding 
time limits for the payment service users to see 
the recovery of their funds.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the explanatory notes 
to the licence application issued by the DNB 



















(the central bank) suggest that the creation 
of a third-party funds foundation is the 
only way to comply with the safeguarding 
requirement under Art 10 (1) (a) PSD2 and 
provide a number of requirements that must 
be complied with in order to achieve proper 
insulation.
Amongst the most important rules are:
	 the third-party funds foundation may 
not carry out any activities other than the 
receiving, managing and distributing of 
clients’ funds; 
	 the third-party funds foundation may not 
engage in commercial activities, issue loans 
or enter into financial obligations;
	 staff members of the payment institution 
involved in activities for the third-party 
funds foundation may not engage in 
activities for the business unit responsible 
for effecting payment transactions; and
	 payment institutions must ensure that 
the liquid assets of the third-party funds 
foundation are at any time at least equal to 
the liabilities of the payment institution to 
payment service users. 
With respect to the book-separation or the 
stricto sensu operational segregation, Dutch 
law does not contain any specific provisions, 
probably because PSD2 does not provide for 
such provisions either. There are no specific 
provisions as regards the identifiability of 
clients’ funds, books and records to be kept and 
their accuracy, reconciliations between internal 
accounts and those of third parties by whom 
the funds are held.
Brazil
In Brazil, the organisational requirements 
stem from Art 12 of Law 12,865/2013, since 
this article prescribes the need to separate the 
payment institution’s assets from the payment 
service users’ assets. BACEN issued several 
Circulares concerning payment institutions and 
payment accounts. 
Amongst the most important ones are:
	 Article 4, Circular 3,680/2013: payment 
institutions must periodically review 
whether their registers are up to date;
	 Article 6-A, Circular 3,680/2013: payment 
institutions have to adopt processes to 
verify the validity of the information given 
by the payment service users.
	 Article 1, Annex I, Circular 3,885/2018 
mentions the technical-operational plan, 
which encompasses all the operational 
mechanisms relating to the payment 
institution, the physical and technological 
infrastructure supporting the operations 
carried out by the payment institution, 
internal controls and periodical testing; 
and 
	 Article 12, tenth paragraph, Circular 
3,681/2013: this provides that resources 
“kept” in payment accounts have to be 
entered under specific account headings 
for the purpose of registering the amounts 
safeguarded in BACEN or invested in 
the Government bonds. These account 
headings are described in Carta Circular 
(Circular Letter) 3,951/2019 of BACEN.
Although Brazil has a rule on operational 
segregation in place (represented by Art 12,  
par. 10 of Circular 3, 681/2013 and Circular 
Letter 3, 951/2019), it lacks the appropriate 
detail. 
ENHANCING PROTECTION: THE BEST 
WAY FORWARD
Title to the funds
The Netherlands relies on the interposition of 
an SPV. In this set-up, the requisite insulation 
against claims of other creditors of the 
payment institution is achieved by entrusting 
the funds to a bankruptcy remote entity and 
giving the payment service user a direct right 
against this entity. However, this set-up is not 
carved in stone: the Netherlands is currently 
contemplating enacting specific legislation 
pursuant to which clients’ funds may continue 
to be held by the payment institution itself and 
will constitute a legally segregated estate against 
which recourse can be taken by payment 
service users only and not by other creditors of 
the payment institution. In this scenario, the 
creation of an SPV will no longer be necessary 
to meet the insulation requirement. 
Brazil lacks the “engineering insulation”, 
relying on the operation of law, and the 
monies follow a short path from the hands 
of the payment service users to the payment 
institution, which (generally) buys Brazilian 
government bonds and is effectively the 
owner of these bonds (held ultimately at Selic 
through a credit institution in the name of 
the payment institution). Brazilian legislation 
expressly affirms that clients’ resources 
can never be regarded as property of the 
payment institution (Art 12, items I and III, 
Law 12,865/2013), which means that they 
constitute a separate estate. 
In our view both systems provide for 
adequate arrangements to safeguard the rights 
of clients and we see no reason to favour one 
approach over the other. 
Security interest
In both countries, security interests over clients’ 
funds enabling a third party to dispose of such 
funds in order to recover debts that do not 
relate to the client are not permitted. Clients’ 
funds can be subjected to pledges relative to 
the obligations of the client, but can never be 
subject to, eg pledges relative to obligations of 
the payment institution. 
In our view, it would be advisable for this 
limitation to be extended to set-off rights and to 
apply throughout the EU/EEA. To this end we 
suggest that Art 10 PSD2 be amended to the 
effect that member states ensure that security 
interests or rights of set-off over clients’ funds 
enabling a third party to dispose of clients’ 
funds in order to recover debts that do not 
relate to the client, are not permitted. A similar 
provision should be included in the Brazilian 
legal framework. 
Speed of recovery
Both countries lack hard provisions of time 
limits that may be applicable in case of 
insolvency of the payment institution. This is 
an important feature that distances itself from 
the ideal framework. We consider it advisable 
to include a provision to this effect in Art 10 
PSD2 and in Law 12,865/2013.
Operational requirements
Operational requirements are visible in both 
jurisdictions studied. What both countries 
lack are more detailed (and perhaps unified) 
rules at every level of the “chain” on how to 
book-separate the funds in every option that 
the payment institution has to safeguard, 
eliminating any doubts on how to operationally 





























segregate the funds while keeping the legal 
segregation provisions. This would result in an 
optimised version of Carta Circular 3,951/2019 
in Brazil (and in related amendments in Law 
12,865/2013) and the Besluit prudentiële regels 
Wft in the Netherlands.
In this connection we propose that payment 
institutions should be obliged to keep records 
and accounts enabling them at any time and 
without delay to distinguish funds held for one 
client from funds held for any other client and 
from their own funds, that they must maintain 
their records and accounts in a way that ensures 
their accuracy and that the separate account 
held at the account servicing credit institution 
in which the clients’ funds will be booked can 
easily be distinguished from any accounts 
used to hold funds belonging to the payment 
institution. 
Time of safeguarding
Article 10 (1) (a) of PSD2 states “funds shall 
not be commingled at any time […]”, but also 
affirms that payment institutions must take 
action to safeguard the payment service users’ 
funds only when the funds are held by the payment 
institution by the end of the business day following 
the day in which such funds were received. This 
seems to open a gap of at least one day where 
the funds could be commingled.
“Three interpretations:
Article 10 (1) (a) of PSD2 affirms that 
funds “funds shall not be commingled  
at any time with the funds of any natural  
or legal person other than payment service 
users on whose behalf the funds are held 
and, where they are still held by the payment 
institution and not yet delivered to the payee or 
transferred to another payment service provider 
by the end of the business day following the day 
when the funds have been received, they shall 
be deposited in a separate account in a credit 
institution or invested in secure, liquid low-risk 
assets […]” [italics added]. 
Another way of looking at this provision 
is to assume that the non-commingling rule 
has to be obeyed at all times (time aspect), 
but at the end of the business day following 
the day in which the funds were received by 
the payment institution the funds have to be 
deposited in a credit institution or invested 
in secure, liquid low-risk assets (mechanism 
aspect). Accordingly, in the timeframe 
between the receiving of the funds and the 
end of the following business day, the funds 
may, as long as they are not commingled at 
any time, be invested in high-risk assets or 
kept in vaults, for example. The one-day gap 
could be seen as lacking only a mechanism-
rule. The three interpretations regarding 
the time-mechanism dichotomy are as 
follows: 
1. Deposit in credit institution or investing 
in secure assets and non-commingling 
must be complied with only by the end 
of the business day following the day in 
which the funds were received.
2. Deposit in credit institution or investing 
in secure assets and non-commingling 
must be complied with from the moment 
the funds are received by the payment 
institution.
3. Non-commingling must be complied 
with from the moment the funds are 
received by the payment institution, but 
the mechanism shall be at the discretion 
of the payment institution, and by the 
end of the business day following the day 
which the funds were received, then the 
payment institution must either deposit 
the funds in a credit institution or invest 
in secure assets.”
The mere existence of three possible 
interpretations as to the time when the 
obligation starts is a source of legal uncertainty. 
In such a pivotal feature of the safeguarding 
rule, this uncertainty should not exist. 
Consequently, the Directive should be 
amended to clearly state when the safeguarding 
obligations begin.
CONCLUSION
To enhance the protection of the payment 
service users’ funds, some minor – but 
important – adjustments are necessary.
In the optimal, ideal framework:
	 a provision should be included to the 
effect that security interests or set-off 
rights over clients’ funds enabling a third 
party to dispose of clients’ funds in order 
to recover debts that do not relate to the 
client, are not permitted;
	 a provision stating a time limit for 
the payment service users to recover 
the funds in case of insolvency of the 
payment institution should be inserted, 
as it would strengthen trust in such 
institutions; 
	 lawmakers and/or regulators should 
clearly define operational segregation 
rules and legal segregation rules, explain-
ing how operational segregation must be 
handled to support legal segregation; and
	 Article 10 (1) (a) PSD2 should be 
amended so as to make clear as to when 
the safeguarding obligation begins. 
 It would also be beneficial for payment 
service users if frameworks all over the world 
resemble each other since globalisation makes 
it easier for legal and natural persons to have 
business – and payment accounts – in several 
countries. This is perhaps a romantic goal, 
but a combined effort between countries to 
make rules closer and clearer could result in 
improved legal certainty and more movement 
of money amongst residents and companies of 
different countries.
The objective, after all, is not to determine 
a winner, but to enhance the protection of the 
funds of payment service users. n
1 This article is based on the Advanced LLM 
thesis of the second author submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements of the Master 
of Laws Advanced Studies Programme in  
Law and Finance, Leiden Law School  
(Leiden University).
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